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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE COALITION OF 
SENIOR CITIZENS, et al. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
Defendant/Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover attorneys' fees for 
consumer participation in a case before the Utah Public Service 
Commission, pursuant to the Public Utility Regulatory Policies 
Act (PURPA) 16 U.S.C. §§2631, 2632. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Third District Court for Salt Lake County, 
Honorable David B. Dee presiding, granted Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
* APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
* 
* Case No. 20152 
DISPOSITION SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 26, 1979, Plaintiffs and others submitted a 
Petition to the Utah Public Service Commission (PSC) (Case No. 
79-999-02) requesting a prohibition on all involuntary 
terminations of utility service during winter months and 
requesting rulemaking proceedings to establish rules regarding 
winter termination of utility service by all utilities under the 
jurisdiction of the PSC. (R. 2,3,7 and Transcript before the 
Public Service Commission (hereafter Tr.) at 4-8). On December 
17, 18 and 19, 1979, hearings were held and evidence presented on 
this matter (Tr. 1-503 passim). 
On January 17, 1980, the PSC issued its Report and 
Interim Order denying Plaintiff's Petition but awarding as 
relief certain modifications to the Utah Residential Utility 
Service Regulations (URUSR) sought by Plaintiffs' witnesses. 
(R. 72-79) . By the terms of this Order, the parties met and 
attempted to resolve differences regarding permanent changes to 
URUSR. The PSC considered these proposals and on April 18, 1980, 
issued a draft of proposed rules for incorporating the Interim 
Order. Further hearings were held to consider these proposed 
rules on April 21, August 13, and August 25, 1980. (Tr. Aug. 13, 
1980, p. 1-151; Aug. 25, 1980, p. 152-254). 
On February 19, 1981, the PSC issued its Order Adopting 
Regulations, including many of the revisions to URUSR proposed by 
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ARGUMENT 
I. A CIVIL ACTION FOR INTERVENOR 
COMPENSATION IS AUTHORIZED UNDER PURPA 
WHEN THE STATE HAS NOT ESTABLISHED AN 
"ALTERNATIVE MEANS" WHICH SATISFIES THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF PURPA AND THE STATE 
UTILITY COMMISSION DOES NOT MAKE DIRECT 
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PURPA to reimburse eligible consumer intervenors for the 
reasonable costs of their participation in state PURPA 
proceedings. Here Plaintiffs were such intervenors in just such 
a PURPA proceeding. The three procedures are: (1) direct 
awards made by the utility commission which are paid by the 
electric utility, §2632 (a) (2) (B); (2) a civil action against 
the utility brought by an eligible intervenor in the appropriate 
state court, §2632(a)(2); or (3) a state-sponsored "alternative 
means" program which assures representation of consumers and 
provides intervenor compensation to eligible consumers to assure 
their participation in PURPA-related proceedings, §2632 (b). 
Although PURPA does not mandate which of the three mechanisms the 
state must adopt, it does specify that the absence of a 
state-sponsored "alternative means" program triggers the 
obligation that eligible intervenors must be compensated through 
either civil awards or direct awards. Utah has no such 
alternative means. 
PURPA1s intervenor compensation options are set out as 
follows: 
16 U.S.C. §2632 
Consumer Representation 
(a) - Compensation for Costs of 
Participation or Intervention 
(1) If no alternative means for assuring 
representation of electric consumers is 
adopted in accordance with Subsection 
(b) and if an electric consumer of an 
electric utility substantially 
contributed to the approval, in whole or 
in part, of a position advocated by such 
- 4 -
consumer in a proceeding concerning such 
utility, and relating to any standard 
set forth in Subtitle B, such utility 
shall be liable to compensate such 
consumer (pursuant to paragraph (2)) for 
reasonable attorneys1 fees, expert 
witness fees, and other reasonable costs 
incurred in preparation and advocacy of 
such position in such proceeding 
(including fees and costs of obtaining 
judicial review of any determination 
made in such proceeding with respect to 
such position). 
(2) A consumer entitled to fees and costs 
under paragraph (1) may collect such 
fees and costs from an electric utility 
by bringing a civil action in any State 
court of competent jurisdiction, unless 
the State regulatory authority,..has 
adopted a reasonable procedure pursuant 
to which such authority... 
A. Determines the amount of such fees 
and costs, and 
B. Includes an award of such fees and 
costs in its order in tEe 
proceeding. 
(b) Alternative Means - Compensation shall 
not be required under Subsection (a) if 
the State, [or] the State regulatory 
authority...has provided an alternative 
means for providing adequate 
compensation to persons -
(1) Who have, or represent, an interest 
A. which would not otherwise be 
adequately represented in the 
proceeding,.... 
(Emphasis added) 
Congress provided that each state through its utility 
commission could select the most suitable option from these three 
choices. If the state or state utility commission establishes an 
"alternative means" program (option 1) , the state assumes 
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responsibility to administer and provide a source of funds for 
intervenor compensation. The state utility commission, by 
awarding intervenor compensation in a PURPA case (option 2) ; or 
by deferring to the Act's civil award provision (option 3) , 
effectively chooses to pass the costs of PURPA intervenor funding 
on to the individual electric utilities in the state. 
The civil action procedure is appropriate where no 
state "alternative means" exists and/or the commission does not 
make direct awards either as a policy choice or due to limited 
statutory authority. 
The simple test for determining if the state-sponsored 
"alternative means" program satisfies the requirements of both 
§2632 (a) and (b) is to determine whether the state program 
provides compensation and assures the adequate representation of 
consumers whose interests would otherwise not be represented. 
Not surprisingly, most states which have adopted a PURPA 
intervenor compensation procedure have decided that existing 
state-provided consumer representation did not fulfill the Act's 
"alternative means" requirements and have chosen not to establish 
new PURPA-based "alternative means" programs at state expense. 
Instead, they have established that the reasonable costs of 
consumer intervention must be paid by the utilities through 
direct awards. See California, Re Costs of Participation in Elect] 
Ratemaking Proceedings, 37 PUR 4th 259 (1980); Maine, Re Costs of 
Participation in Comm'n. Proceedings on PURPA, 37 PUR 4th 280 
(1980); Alaska, In Re Procedure for Compensation of Electric 
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Consumers, 38 PUR 4th 127 (1980). South Dakota, Kansas, West 
Virginia and Minnesota have established similar procedures. 
The Michigan Public Service Commission identified no 
applicable "alternative means" program within the state. But 
unlike most states, Michigan does not make direct awards in its 
rate orders. Instead, the Commission explicitly stated that 
eligible intervenors must bring a civil action in court against 
the utility as provided in §2632 (a)(1). Proceedings to Consider 
Electric Ratemaking Standards, 35 PUR 4th 339, 343 (Mich. P.S.C. 
1980). (The Utah Public Service Commission recently directed 
such an action in another case involving Utah Power. See Ex. 1). 
The Michigan Commission acknowledged that it could adopt an 
alternative means procedure and it considered the Act's direct 
award procedure, but concluded that it had no statutory authority 
under state law to award expenses in an administrative 
proceeding. Courts in Idaho and Montana have also denied 
commission authority to award fees and required court action. See 
Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 639 P.2d 
442 (Idaho 1981), and Montana-Dakota Utilities Company v. Montana 
Dept. of Public Service Regulation, 50 PUR 4th 481 (Mont. Dist. 
Ct. 1982). 
Since it is undisputed that Utah does not make direct 
awards, only if an "alternative means" exists can Utah Power 
avoid payment. 
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II. UTAH HAS NO "ALTERNATIVE MEANS" PROGRAM; 
THEREFORE A CIVIL ACTION IS AVAILABLE TO 
CONSUMER INTERVENORS 
An "alternative means" program which complies with the 
requirements of 16 U.S.C. §2632 (a) and (b) precludes a civil 
action for intervenor compensation. 
Of PURPA's three intervenor compensation procedures, 
the state-sponsored "alternative means" program is the most 
difficult to neatly define. This is in part because Congress 
left much of the design of such programs to the states. Unlike 
the easily conceptualized civil action and direct award options, 
the "alternative means" referred to in the Act is characterized 
as a state-developed program which must meet certain basic 
requirements, while the actual form and operation of the program 
is left to the discretion of the state. 
The "alternative means" term is first found in §2632(a) 
in the context that, if the state adopts an "alternative means 
for assuring representation of electric customers/1 the utility 
is relieved of the responsibility to provide compensation for 
consumer intervention. (Emphasis added.) The "alternative 
means" is further defined in the next subsection of the Act as: 
" an alternative means for providing adequate compensation to 
persons" who, " (1) have or represent an interest - (A) which 
would not otherwise be adequately represented and, (B) repre-
sentation of which is necessary for a fair determination in the 
proceeding" §2632 (b) (1) (A) and (B). (Emphasis added.) 
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These two requirements are confirmed by the legislative 
history, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1750, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code 
Cong, and Ad. News, 7797, 7816-7: 
...The purpose of this section is to prcvide 
a mechanism to assure that the interests of 
electric consumers will be represented at the 
State level in proceedings dealing with 
standards set forth in Subtitle B. The 
mechanism chosen for this purpose is either 
of two options. One makes the utility liable 
to provide compensation directly to electric 
consumers who substantially contribute to the 
approval in whole or in part, of a position 
advocated by the consumer in a proceeding 
concerning the utility relating to any 
standard set forth in this title by creating 
a right of action against the utility. The 
second option provides that a State or State 
regulatory authority or non-regulated utility 
may have a program to otherwise provide 
adequate compensation to persons described in 
Subsection (b) . Such a program may include 
an adequately funded office of public counsel 
which adequately represents the interests of 
persons described in paragraphs (1) and (2) 
of Subsection (b). (Emphasis added.) 
The Report makes it very clear that a state providing 
an "alternative means" program must include intervenor funding as 
part of the program. This section of the report refers first to 
the state-provided adequate compensation to persons described in 
Subsection (b). It then adds that such a program of compensation 
might include an office of public counsel which, as part of its 
responsibility, represents the interests of the public generally 
or a particular class of consumers specifically, provided that 
the agency also encouraged otherwise unrepresented consumers to 
participate in PURPA proceedings and compensated those eligible 
for the reasonable costs of their participation. 
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The best analysis of the requirements of an 
"alternative means" program was made by the California Public 
Utilities Commission in Re Costs of Participation in Electric 
Ratemaking Proceedings, 37 PUR 4th 259, 264 (Cal. P.U.C. 1980). 
California found that no existing state 
office, including the Attorney General and in particular its own 
staff, offered an "alternative means" program for two fundamental 
reasons. First, while a state agency or utility commission 
staff could advocate for the public interest broadly defined, it 
could not always adequately represent specific consumer 
interests. Second, the range of interests in any given hearing 
could not be represented by one office alone. The Commission 
stated: 
The Commission cannot, however, say that in 
all cases the staff will adequately represent 
the persons described in Section 122(b) 
[2632 (b)]. As noted above, the staff is 
charged with representing the broad public 
interest. Often, this will be a compromise 
of many interests, including those of the 
utility. The staff may conclude that the 
public interest is not the same as the 
interests of those consumers described in 
Section 122(b). Further, there are many 
differing and often competing consumer 
interests in any proceeding considering PURPA 
issues. Any staff would be hard pressed to 
represent all of these interests. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In Utah the Division of Public Utilities, whose duties are 
spelled out in Utah Code Ann. §54-4a-l et. seq. , like the staff of 
the California Commission, is charged with promoting many 
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competing interests, including maintaining the financial health 
of the utilities. It certainly cannot represent consumer 
interests. Nor can the Commission's own small staff. 
The Alaska Public Utility Commission also decided to 
order direct awards of intervenor funding in PURPA proceedings. 
In Re Procedure for Compensation of Electric Consumers, 38 PUR 
4th 127, 132 (1980). That Commission first concluded that the 
federal act required that any "alternative means" program must 
include a means for adequately compensating consumer intervenors, 
and a state law department (either the Attorney General or the 
Utility Commission) is a deficient "alternative means" program 
because its representation of the public interest is not 
necessarily identical to that of an individual or class of 
consumers. 
This is the key to understanding why the existence of 
the Committee of Consumer Services, established by statute at 
Utah Code Ann. §54-10-1 et seq. to represent residential 
consumers and small commercial enterprises, is not an alternative 
means in this case. First, it is not authorized, nor is any 
other part of state government, to award compensation to 
consumers for participation in utility cases and thus fails to 
meet one prong of the test. In addition, its counsel in this 
case, James Barker, described several restrictions on the actual 
operation of the Committee of Consumer Services which preclude 
its being the "alternative means" here: the Committee is not 
- 11 -
adequately funded (R. 167-8); sometimes conflicts of interest 
between segments of the population the Committee is authorized to 
represent preclude effective representation of all interests (R. 
172); and the position advocated by Plaintiffs here seemed 
inconsistent with Committee policy in this case (R. 175). In 
addition, the Committee's participation in this hearing was 
passive and cannot be considered "adequate representation" of 
low-income and senior citizen intervenors. For all these 
reasons, the Committee's existence should not bar the award of 
fees. 
The only case which squarely addresses the "alternative 
means" question is POWER v. Washington Water Power Co,, 662 P. 2d 
374 (Wash. 1983). In that case a sharply divided Washington 
Supreme Court held 5-4 that the minimal participation in a 
utility rate case by a special assistant attorney general who 
merely assisted members of the public in testifying precluded the 
award of PURPA fees to a consumer group who actively participated 
in the same case. The majority held that since the assistant 
attorney general was 1) independent of the regulatory authority; 
2) empowered to appear and participate in any regulatory or 
judicial proceeding; 3) authorized to retain outside experts and 
4) authorized to hire and retain sufficient staff, the 
requirements for PURPA1s "alternative means" were met. 
The dissenters discussed the question of adequate 
representation and concluded that the focus should be on the 
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actual authority to hire experts and staff and whether this was 
done. Since in that specific case there was no such authority, 
they would have awarded compensation. 
Public policy in Utah should not require consumers who 
successfully contribute to a PURPA-related PSC decision to go 
without compensation when the Committee of Consumer Services 
merely appears but takes no active role in the decision or when 
it does not appear at all or appears and takes a position 
contrary to other consumers. The California and Alaska PUC 
analyses about the defects in such a system certainly apply here. 
Consumers should be reimbursed unless there is a viable 
alternative means which adequately represents their interest in 
a particular case and provides compensation. That simply did not 
occur here. 
III. PLAINTIFFS SUBSTANTIALLY CONTRIBUTED TO 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ORDER 
BELOW 
In addition to commencing this action, Plaintiffs made 
certain recommendations which were presented primarily through 
the testimony of witness Bill Biggs. In his testimony he 
stressed (1) the need for customers' actual receipt of notice of 
termination of service (Tr. 33-34) , (2) more definite regulations 
controlling and making mandatory the customer option to make 
deferred payments on deposits (Tr. 32) and delinquent accounts 
(Tr. 35-36) , and (3) mandatory notification of termination to the 
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occupant of a residence where the occupant is not the account 
holder (Tr. 39-40). All of this testimony pertained to the PURPA 
standard on termination of service, 16 U.S.C. §§2623(b)(4) and 
2625(g). 
Significant changes occurred in both Rule 5 (Deferred 
Payment Agreement) and Rule 6 (Termination) of the Utah Public 
Service Commission's Rules as a result of Plaintiffs' 
recommendations. First, the provision for a third-party 
designee to receive notification of termination at the request of 
the account holder was made available to all residential users, 
Rule 6(f)(3). Second, the regulations now include the 
requirements of a "good faith effort" on the part of the utility 
to notify the account holder or an adult member of the household 
within 48 hours of the scheduled termination. Third, the 
deferred payment option was made a right of the customer rather 
than a discretionary action of the utility, Rule 5(a)(1). This 
deferred payment option covers not only delinquent balances, but 
reconnection charges and security deposits as well, Rule 4(a)(4). 
Fourth, the new regulations include a provision for the 
protection of an occupant of a residence who is not the account 
holder who is ill, Rule 6(c). Finally, a provision requires 
notice to the occupant of the termination of service at the 
request of a landlord. Rule 6(h). Each of these changes 
occurred solely at Plaintiffs' urging, are substantial, and 
demonstrate the magnitude of Plaintiffs' contribution to the 
proceedings. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs are entitled to fees for prosecuting this 
case and this appeal by virtue of PURPA since they substantially 
contributed to the decision in this matter and Utah has 
established no alternative means to represent consumers and 
reimburse them. The lower court decision should be reversed. 
DATED this ZV^day of Q , 1984. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants 
By: / W j l ^ 
/BRUCE PLENK 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Appellants' Brief, first class, postage prepaid, 
to Robert Gordon and David Lloyd, Attorneys for Defendant, at 
P. 0. Box 899, 1407 W. N. Temple, Suite 340, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84110, this ^jH^ day of October, 1984. 
1U^JAC^I^ 
->L 
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EXHITBIT 1 
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE CODIMISSIO^ OF UTAH -
In the Matter of the Petition ) 
of the SAL? LAKE COMMUNITY ) 
ACTION PROGRAM i^ ND UTAH ISSUES ) 
for Prohibition on Winter ) 
Termination of Gas and Electric ) 
Utilitv Service. ) 
ISSUED: April 11, 1984 
3y the Commission: 
By Motion dated Hay 23, 1933, the Salt Lake Community 
Action Program and Utah Issues ("Petitioners") requested thin 
Commission to award its attorneys1 fees in the amount c* 
$5,212.50. This Motion, based on Section 122 of the Public 
Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), 16 U.S.C. § 2632 (1979), 
requested compensation for the efforts of 3ruce Plenk, an 
attorney with Utah Legal Services, Inc., for representing 
Petitioners in the above-described case before the Public Service 
Commission. 
Utah Power and Light Company, Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company, and Utah Gas Service Company, three utilities that were 
parties to the proceedings, opposed the Motion for Attorneys1 
Fees. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission having carefully'consid-
ered the arguments in the case and being fully advised concerning 
the relevant law, issues the following Findings and Conclusions 
and Order based thereon: 
CASS 
ORDEn 
MO. 
DE>" 
FOR ATT^10. 
32 
•—• V 
- a c q -
G MOT 
C * IT7"*' 
1 / 
Zn'y* 
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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. Petitioners are not seeking reimbursement of 
attorneysT fees from any gas utility company. Their notion for 
award of attorneys' fees is directed at Utah Power ar,d Light 
Company and any other affected electric utility companies under 
the provisions of Section 122 of PURPA. 
2. Unlike Mountain Fuel Supply Company, Utah Power and 
Light Company has not been a primary opponent on the request for 
a moratorium on winter termination of gas and electric utility 
service and this Commission is unwilling to require that Utah 
Power and Light pay the attorneys1 fees sought. 
3. There exists an alternative mechanism for obtaining 
the attorneys1 fees sought herein by Petitioners through the 
District Court. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Commission makes the 
following 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the Motion 
for Attorneys1 Fees requested by the Salt Lake Community Action 
Program and Utah Issues and Mr. Plenk, as their attorney, be and 
is hereby denied. 
-3-
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 11th day of April, 
1984. 
I si Brent H. Cameron, Chairran 
(SEAL* I si David R. Irvine, Commissioner 
I si James M. Byrne, Commissioner 
Attest: 
I si Georgia B. Peterson, Secretary 
